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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1958

the instant case. The history of the use of the stream between 1941
and 1952 is not in the record, so no generalization is possible.
Assuming that proper application of the law vested both the use
iight and the consumptive right in plaintiffs, subject to the beneficial
use limitation previously noted," plaintiffs still may not be able to
use the stream for livestock watering without a permit, since the
statute,"0 in referring to "any person," does not exclude riparian
owners from its requirements." The consumption of water from a
stream by a herd of livestock is usually deemed an appropriation."8
The injunction granted plaintiffs was therefore consonant with the
general rule that a riparian can enjoin a non-riparian from diverting
water, even when the diversion does not injure the riparian." However, since the land was arid and practically useless without water,
some provision could have been made to allow use of the surplus by
defendants. Drafting the decree to conform with the law would have
appropriately provided for the parties. Control over the stream should
have remained in plaintiffs, the riparian owners, with the surplus then
allocated to defendants. Both would need permits for their respective
uses.
From the state of the evidence gathered, only partial answers can
be suggested to the four questions posed earlier. It is submitted that
whatever authority there is in Wallace v. Weitman must be restricted
to congruent factual situations."
STANLEY B. ALLPER
PARTINRSHIPS
Partnership-Contribution to Loss in Absence of Agreement. The recent case of

Richert v. Handly, 153 Wash. Dec. 104, 330 P.2d 1079 (1958), was an action for an
accounting and dissolution of a logging partnership in which one of the partners contributed the capital, while the other agreed to manage the concern. The receipts of
the partnership were not sufficient to cover the capital contribution. Upon finding that
the parties had not agreed upon a basis for sharing losses or whether the claims of
one partner were to take priority over the claims of the other, the trial court concluded
35 Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23 (1923).
36 RCW 90.20.010. However, if plaintiffs' riparian right dates prior to 1917, a permit may not be needed.
37 After 1917 even a riparian owner could not appropriate without a permit. Proctor
v. Sim, 134 Vash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
:1 Steptoe Livestock Co. v. Gulely, 53 Nev. 163, 295 Pac. 772 (1931); Empire
Water Co. v. Cascade, 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
30 See, e.g., Mally v. Viedensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 153 Pac. 342 (1915).
40 For an authoritative treatment of the general subject of water rights in Wash-

ington, see Horowitz, Riparianand Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water in Washington, 1 VAsH. L. Rav. 197 (1932) ; Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch,
31 WAsH. L. REv. 243 (1956).
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that neither partner was entitled to judgment against the other, since the amount due
each could not be determined.
The supreme court reversed, holding that in the absence of agreement the rights
and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership are governed by the provisions
r
of the Uniform Partnership Act, RCW 25.04.180, which provides (1) that each
partner must contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained
by the partnership according to his share in the profits and (2) that no partner is
entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business. Applying this to the
instant case, the managing partner was required to recompense his co-partner for one
half the losses sustained on his capital contribution.
The Uniform Partnership Act thus operates to require a partner who contributes
only services, in the absence of agreement, to risk not only receiving nothing for his
services but also being required to indemnify his partner against capital losses. See
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP

§ 65, p. 345 (2d ed. 1952) ; Note, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1924).

A party should guard against the result in the Richert case by taking care to fix his
respective liability in advance by express agreement.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Summary Judgment. In CapitalHill Methodist Church v. Seattle,'
the Washington court reviewed for the first time a case involving an
application of Rule 19(1) of the Washington Rules of Pleading,
Practice and Procedure,2 dealing with motions for summary judgments.3
The case involved a petition by non-abutting property owners
seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Seattle city ordinance providing
for the vacation of a public street in response to a petition by the
defendant Group Health Cooperative. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged
1152 Wash. Dec. 305, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958). For a discussion of the substantive
points involved in the case, see casenote, page 212, this issue.
2 34A Wn.2d, Cumulative Supplement July 1957, page 29, which reads, in part:
1. Summary Judgment: (a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of the period within which the
defendant is required to appear, or after a service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. (b) For
Defendant Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof. (c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party, prior to the day of hearing, may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Omitted are sections (d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion; (e)
Form of Affidavits' Further Testimony; (f) When Affidavits are Unavailable and (g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.
As adopted by Washington originally in 1951, Rule 19(1) was a limited version
of its present text, including only the present sections (a) and (b), leaving open for

